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  This thesis examines the writings of European diplomats, travelers and 
merchants in the Ottoman Empire in order to demonstrate that the historiographical 
tradition of the Ottomans as enemy to all Europeans was not the only opinion expressed 
in the early modern sources.  Instead, the thesis will show that while the polemical voices 
were an important part of early modern European thought, they were responses to 
specific events in the course of European and Ottoman history, and they were not the only  
views held by diplomats and travelers familiar with the Ottoman Empire.  In fact, the 
source material spans a wide range of opinions and attitudes of the Ottoman Empire, the 
people inhabiting it and the religion of Islam.  While the Empire was in many ways 
unique, the voices of Europeans familiar with it demonstrate that it was an important part 
of diplomatic and trade relationships with Europe, and if not fully part of the continent, 
and an integral aspect of European politics and diplomacy.  
 Fundamental to this thesis is the idea that eastern and central Europe follow a 
historical path quite distinct from the European nations of the Atlantic World.  Rather 
than exploring and colonizing lands unfamiliar with Europeans, eastern Europeans faced 
a rival, often hostile, which maintained both a military advantage as well as a cultural and 
religious history that matched their own.  As such, the population of eastern Europe was 
required to come to terms with historical circumstances that were quite distinct from 
those of western Europe, and those circumstances are reflected in the historical accounts 
left by those who interacted with the Ottoman Empire, as well as those who feared it.  
iii
This interaction left a distinct impression on the history of central and eastern Europe and 
the Ottoman Empire as well.
iv
Chapter I: Introduction
 For over six hundred years, the Ottoman Turks were the enemy on the border of 
Europe, the heathen at the gates of Christendom, the scourge of God sent to punish the 
sinner and test the faith of the righteous.  Myth and symbol, enemy and outsider, both 
heathen in religion and barbaric in nature, the Ottomans were characterized as the 
traditional enemy for the nations of Europe.  Yet despite the prevalence of this type of 
rhetoric, the political reality forced the monarchs and sovereigns of Europe to deal with 
the ‘heathen’ in the same way they dealt with each other.  Further, trade was the lifeblood 
of individuals and governments alike, and the lucrative trade with the Middle East and 
locales beyond it forced Europeans to deal with their nominal enemies as people, rather 
than as the symbols impressed upon them by pedagogues and preachers. The results of 
these interactions produced a history of contact that was far more complex than the 
simple rehashing of the idea of the Turks as the infidel enemy, and a historiographical 
trend which often accepted such polemics as the obvious and singular truth.  
 Upon consideration, the polemics seem to be only part of the picture, and while 
they are part of a long tradition stretching from early Christian historiography in the 
hands of scholars such as Paulus Orosius to twentieth century scholars of international 
relations like Edward Said, they captured only a small part of the interaction between 
Europeans and Ottomans.  While current historians are widening the scope of acceptable 
sources and drawing more material from Ottoman records, many still rely overmuch on 
the polemical voices like Martin Luther, without considering where such polemics fit into 
the wider narrative.  Just as Edward Said’s Orientalism theory assumes the preexistence 
of European superiority, it is often assumed that the polemics of men like Luther shaped 
the conflict between Europeans and Ottomans, rather than being shaped by it. Indeed this 
is one of the major areas where Said received criticism.  Daniel Martin Varisco, in his 
critique Reading Orientalism, Said and the Unsaid, often felt trapped by Said’s implicit 
assumptions.  As Varisco puts it, “There is no way to be an Orientalist in anything but bad 
faith,”1 and that outsiders studying the Middle East could in many ways, be assumed to 
be guilty of bias and bigotry. 
 Nonetheless, one of the most important historiographical theories to consider for a 
discussion of European and Ottoman relations remains Edward Said’s Orientalism.  
Said’s general argument is that the conceptual identity of the Orient was created by 
European powers as a method of domination, and this crafted identity was imposed on 
the Middle East in particular as a result of the historical domination of the Middle East by 
Europeans.   While Said did focus primarily on the twentieth century, he also took some 
effort to examine the historical relationship between Europe and the Middle East as he 
saw it.  He traced the origins of Orientalism to the twelfth century and assumed a 
relationship of European dominance as a constant throughout the entire course of nine 
centuries. “The other feature of Oriental-European relations was that Europe was always 
in a position of strength, not to say domination.”2  However, an examination of the 
relations between the Middle East and Europe suggested something completely different 
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 1 Daniel Martin Varisco, Reading Orientalism, Said and the Unsaid. (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2007), 97.
 2 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 40.
for most of that history; particularly an examination of the history of the Crusades and of 
the Ottoman Empire produced a very different picture.  While the relationship between 
the two regions was largely hostile, Europeans could hardly be described as dominant: 
the Crusaders were unable to build upon initially victories and their armies and holdings 
were often overwhelmed by Muslim forces.  Similarly, the history of the Ottoman Empire 
was, until the late seventeenth century, largely one of Turkish victory and conquest.  The 
military historian Jeremy Black argued that by the mid seventeenth century, the problem 
of Ottoman power was the most pressing concern for Europeans.  The Turks had made 
the most gains over the preceding three centuries, and although they had made no 
significant inroads in territorial acquisition, their earlier conquests had also not been 
reversed.3 Furthermore, according to Black, “for much of Europe, the crucial relationship 
was ...along the fault-line between Christendom and Islam” and that “Christian Europe 
was in awe of the Turks.”4  In an objective view, the power relationships did not truly 
began to shift in favor of Europe until the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699.5 Furthermore, 
clear domination of the Middle East was not easily visible until the latter half of the 
eighteenth century, when European economic concerns were running roughshod over the 
interests of the Turkish Porte.6
3
 3 Jeremy Black, European International Relations 1648-1815 (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 63.
 4 Black, 63.
 5 The Treaty of Karlowitz was one of the defining moments in European-Ottoman relations.  
Under the terms of the treaty, the Hapsburgs gained control of Hungary and most of Transylvania, and other 
members of the Holy League made smaller territorial gains, while the Ottomans retained control of 
Belgrade.  Most importantly, the treaty was a major loss of territory for the Ottoman Empire and was the 
beginning of a power shift that would gradually worsen for the Ottoman Empire over the course of the 
eighteenth century. See Ernest R. Dupuy and Trevor Dupuy, The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History. 
4th ed. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), 638.
 6 A term used by European diplomats for the Ottoman Foreign Ministry.
 However, while Said’s argument of dominance is historically flawed, he did tap 
into an accurate sense of European attitudes towards the Middle East and those who lived 
there.  In this regard the attitudes of Europeans are quite consistent across historical 
periods.  As an example, Said cited the views of Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, the United 
Kingdoms official ‘representative’ and governor in Egypt at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.  A particular quote Said used to illustrate his argument was one of 
Cromer’s: “I content myself with noting the fact that somehow or other the Oriental 
generally acts, speaks, and thinks in a manner exactly opposite to the European.”7  This 
quote echoes a summary given over three centuries earlier by Jean Dumont, who while 
born in France, was made Baron of Carlscroon8 by the Holy Roman Emperor, whose 
letters describing his travels in the Middle East were published in 1696. In them, he 
observed “the Turks are opposite to us in almost all respects.”9  This reiteration of such a 
view of the Ottomans helps to illustrate the strength and consistency of centuries of anti-
Turkish and anti-Muslim rhetoric.
 This consistency of attitude is a fundamental example of the continuing value of 
Said’s thesis, despite its flaws and inconsistencies.  The attitudes he was looking for were 
definitely present among Early Modern Europeans, but the cause he ascribed was 
fundamentally flawed.  The question that needs to be examined in the wake of Said is 
whether there was simply a different motivation than what Said attributed to dominance, 
4
 7 Said, 39.
 8 In the German lands, approximately one hundred miles south of the Prussian coast.
 9 Jean Dumont, A New Voyage to the Levant, (London, Printed by T. H. for M. Gillyflower, in 
Westminster-Hall; T. Goodwin, at the Queen's-Head, and M. Wotton, at the Three Daggers in Fleetstreet; J. 
Walthoe, under the Cloisters in the Middle-Temple; and R. Parker, at the Unicorn under the Royal 
Exchange, 1696), 149.
or if the attitudes Said assigned to the Europeans are the only attitudes Europeans’ 
expressed or if the reality is much more complicated.  Even Dumont, despite the 
profound dislike and discontent he expressed towards the Turkish people, was forced to 
assign them some positive qualities: “For the Turks are very Religious observers of their 
Promises to their own Subjects; tho' they scruple not to violate Treaties concluded with 
Neighbouring Princes, especially Christians.”10  Admissions such as this one provide a 
glimpse at the importance of ideas beyond the simple polemical view.  Despite the 
rhetoric of opposition and conceptualization of Ottomans and Europeans as enemies, 
common ground and respect, however grudging, was a possibility that went beyond 
religious rhetoric and military opposition.
 Another useful historiographical source comes from the field of travel writing, 
particularly the idea of ‘contact zones’ as utilized by Mary Louise Pratt in Imperial Eyes, 
a discussion of eighteenth century British Imperial travel literature.  Pratt defines ‘contact 
zones’ as “the space in which peoples geographically and historically separated come into 
contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of 
coercion, radical inequality and intractable conflict.”11  While Pratt herself largely 
utilizes contact zones in terms of colonial frontiers, the concept is equally useful in 
dealing with European interactions with the Ottoman Empire, with the Balkan Peninsula, 
Hungary and Istanbul itself as the contact zone.  Istanbul is a rather peculiar instance of a 
contact zone, as it is the capital of the Ottoman Empire, but the relatively high percentage 
5
 10 Dumont, 186.
 11 Mary Lousie Pratt, Imperial Eyes, Travel Writing and Transculturation (London: Routledge, 
1992), 7.
of Christians who lived in the city, coupled with the volume of trade and the large number 
of European accounts of visits to Istanbul all suggest a very high level of contact, which 
in turn provides a great deal of insight into the nature of European and Ottoman relations.  
The most significant deviation from Pratt’s theory is that neither culture can be 
considered dominant in the early modern period.  While the Ottomans had significant 
military successes after the conquest of Constantinople, by the sixteenth century the 
conflict between Ottomans and Europeans had largely settled into indecisive military 
engagements across a divided Hungary and in sporadic wars and engagements throughout 
the Mediterranean. The levels of coercion, inequality and conflict vary significantly, but 
contact between the two cultures remains consistent, and both communication and trade 
remained a fact of life, despite the conflict and rhetoric of intolerance and destruction.  
 By comparison, Stephen Greenblatt, in his work on European contact with the 
New World, Marvelous Possessions, argued that relationships with others were usually 
both expected and normalized by the social structures of the group: in this case, 
Europeans.12  Greenblatt further argued that the assumptions and behaviors recorded in 
the sources by Europeans ultimately manifested a greater insight into their own behavior 
and how they coped with unfamiliar situations, usually by tightening their grip on 
familiar forms and rituals.13  This theory impacted directly on European-Ottoman 
relationships by providing a potential vehicle of explanation for the abundance of 
polemical literature against the Ottomans.  That type of reactionary literature had roots in 
6
 12 Stephen Greenblatt, Marvelous Possessions, The Wonder of the New World (Chicago: The 
Univertsity of Chicago Press, 1991), 53-4.
 13 Greenblatt, 55.
the historiography of the early Christian church, and as such, would have been familiar to 
many of those educated men reacting to the Ottoman Empire.  Significantly, the religious 
polemics of the sixteenth century will draw directly from that tradition in order to cast the 
Ottomans as infidel, outsider and threat.
 It is the contradiction between rhetoric and communication that needs to be 
explained and examined, as the polemical rhetoric that is generally accepted as the norm 
among historians does not explain the the areas of non-violent coexistence and even 
cooperation among European Christians and Ottomans in the early modern period.  By 
examining the accounts that stray from the polemical arguments, it is possible to come to 
some understanding of what else was going on between Christians and Muslims during 
what is widely perceived to be a time of conflict and war.  Modern scholars have begun to 
recognize the problems associated with the traditional polemic view of Ottomans and 
Muslims.  Virginia Aksan and Daniel Goffman, in the introduction to The Early Modern 
Ottomans: Remapping the Empire, acknowledge that many historical works on the 
Ottomans lack proper historical scholarship.  Rather than deriving from an understanding 
of Ottoman civilization, too often such works examined the “Ottoman world only through 
the eyes of often rather ignorant and even hostile foreigners.”14 However, the point of this 
work is to examine the variety of those very sources, and determine if there is more to 
them than is commonly believed.  While the understanding of Ottoman sources is vital, 
early modern Ottoman-European relations can not be grasped without understanding the 
variety of opinions and beliefs held by early modern Europeans.  
7
 14 Virginia Aksan and Daniel Goffman, The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 8.
 The works of Martin Luther, the Türkenbüchlein15 and others are a problem for 
Said’s thesis, because while they do reflect a desire to dominate, they largely illustrate an 
intense fear of being dominated by the Ottomans.  This fear is so intense that the only 
perceived solution by many religious authors is a direct intervention by God, as all the 
armies and defenses of men are described as wholly inadequate to the task of defending 
Europe.16  While this is not the only view espoused in Europe, particularly in the 
seventeenth century, it is a common view among both historical records and writings in 
the late medieval and early modern periods and among modern historians as well. In this 
regard, it is important to understand the basis for the polemical viewpoint and to have 
some idea of why it is the default assumption among scholars, even if it does not form the 
totality of early modern viewpoints on the Ottoman Turks. The intense fear of being 
dominated, destroyed, conquered or spiritually corrupted demonstrated exactly why this 
can be considered polemical literature. It was a violent, albeit written, reaction to an other 
that appears to threaten many aspects of European life and society, and each polemic 
fueled further reactions of the same type.
 One twentieth century scholar who examined the prevalence of the polemical 
viewpoint was Franklin Baumer, who argued that even after the politics of European-
Ottoman interaction became more complicated than simply the idea of the ‘infidel at the 
8
 15 ‘Books against the Turks’, written tracts about the Turkish military threat that began appearing 
in German lands in the early sixteenth century.  See John W. Bohnstedt, “The Infidel Scourge of God: The 
Turkish Menace as Seen by German Pamphleteers of the Reformation Era,” Transactions of the American 
Philosophical Society 58 (1968), 1-58.
 16 Martin Luther, Luther’s Works Volume 54: Table Talk, ed. Theodore Tappert (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1967), 419.
gate,’ the language of animosity continued to be replicated in early modern documents.17  
Baumer claimed that this tendency and the attitude of exclusion continued through the 
seventeenth century and did not wholly disappear from European politics until after the 
Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699.  Yet it is clear from the primary sources that the polemical 
view was not the only view of the Ottomans in the seventeenth century, and that practical 
politics and personal interaction between Europeans and Turks was slowly eroding the 
boundaries formed by the polemical rhetoric. However, to understand the framework that 
produced those later views, it is important to examine the polemical views that preceded 
them and continued to exist alongside them, as they are a major part of both later 
scholarship and the religious and political rhetoric of the early modern period. 
 The attitudes of the Western elites were also shared, or at least disseminated to, 
the general population of Europe in this period.  Broadsheets, newspapers and private 
correspondence all extolled the victorious defense of Europe and the ‘cause of God.’  In a 
letter to a fellow officer, one A. Whitebrook expressed his relief at the victory at Vienna: 
“the great deliverance it hath pleased God to give... from the Cruelties and Barbarieties it 
groaned under by the Savage Violences of Turkish Infidels.”18  The juxtaposition of 
God’s mercy and the cruelties of the foe was the most common formula among the 
contemporary accounts.  The only ambivalent records were those left by travel writers 
and merchants, who provided some praise for the Ottoman Turks while they mouthed the 
9
 17  Franklin Baumer, “England, the Turk, and the Common Corps of Christendom.” The American 
Historical Review 50 (Oct, 1944), 28.
 18  A. Whitebrook, A True Copy of a Letter From an English Gentleman in the Emperour’s Army, to 
an English Officer in Holland (London: Printed by E. Maller, 1683).
formulas of distrust for the infidels.19 In many cases, the real opinion of the writers was 
difficult to discern, as economics, religious beliefs and personal prejudices produced a 
confusing welter of motivations.  Nevertheless, they partook of the general attitudes of 
Christendom toward the Turks, but often placed economic needs over the theoretical need 
for defense against the Turks.  However, neither those who denigrated the Ottomans nor 
those who urged trade suggested the possibility of converting the Ottomans to 
Christianity.  Even the most tolerant of the travel writers saw an irrevocable barrier 
between Christian and Muslim, one that could only be overcome with conquest and 
death.  Even Paul Rycaut, who in 1668, concluded his work with a discussion of the 
benefits of English trade with the Ottoman Empire, remarks on the cruel nature of “this 
great Oppressor of Christianity,” even while he was swayed by the financial advantages 
of peace and trade.20
 Many of the polemical views on the Ottomans largely fit one of two broad 
patterns. The first was a religious perspective, where the Muslims in general, and the 
Turks in particular21 are enemies of both Christians and God, a test of faith, or a 
punishment sent by God to punish the faithful for straying.  As such, their destruction was 
often advocated, but ultimately left in the hands of God, until such time as the faithful 
proved themselves worthy of such mercy.  The other major category of polemics is that of 
10
 19  The attitudes of the contemporary population would be ill-served if this term did not appear at 
least once, however it should be noted that it should only be taken as part of the historical attitude of 
Christians and Muslims toward each other in this period.
 20  Paul Rycaut, The Present State of the Ottoman Empire (New York: Arno Press, 1971), 217-218.
 21 Indeed, these terms are often used interchangeably in Europe in the early modern period.  Arabic 
writers have noted with some irritation that ‘Turk’ was used for members of the Islamic faith far more often 
than Muslim was. Notably remarked on by Ahmad bin Qasim al Hajaril, “The Book of the Protector of 
Religion Against the Unbelievers,” in In the Lands of the Christians, ed. Nabil Matar (New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 9.
military men who had faced the Ottomans in battle, and wrote to rally the Christian 
nations, their monarchs and fellow soldiers against the Ottomans.  While these accounts 
often focused on the military threat and offered tactical and strategic advice, there was 
usually a strong element of religious rhetoric, most likely to encourage the appeal and 
distribution of their manuscripts, and to tap into the religious divide between Christian 
and Muslim. The goals of these accounts was to spur military action against the Ottomans 
and end the perceived threat to Christendom.  There were a great deal of existing 
polemical accounts, ranging from pamphlets, broadsheets and newspapers written by 
clergy and laity alike, as well as military polemics written by those who campaigned 
directly against the Ottomans or supported such campaigns.  Others wrote to support 
military action, or decry the military efforts of the nobility as insufficient to the cause at 
hand.  For purposes of this study, it was necessary to limit the primary sources to a 
manageable amount that showcased a variety of viewpoints.
 While the fall of Constantinople in 1453 had generated a great dear of fear and 
dismay in Christendom, the nations of Europe were unwilling and unable to set aside 
their own differences in favor of dealing with the encroaching Ottomans. Indeed, Pope 
Nicholas V’s call for a crusade to recover the city was ignored by the squabbling Italian 
city-states as well as in the courts of the Hapsburgs22 and Capetians.23  Despite the lack of 
response by the kings and princes of Europe, fear and hatred of ‘the infidel’ continued to 
spread through the written works of military figures and the sermons and writings of 
11
 22  Also Habsburg.  Hapsburg is currently slightly more common, but more importantly, it is also 
closer to the German pronunciation.
 23 Bohnstedt, 9.
religious figures like Martin Luther.  These accounts had a lasting effect on the 
historiography, as even in the twentieth century, historians continued to base historical 
works on the ‘outrages’ and assumed negative qualities of the Ottomans.  A good 
example of this is Victor Tapié, whose work, The Rise and Fall of the Hapsburg 
Monarchy, originally published as Monarchie et peuples du Danube in 1969, is heavily 
marked with negative associations against the Turks.  “Cruelties,” “humiliation,” and 
other characterizations “endowed the Turk with the reputation of a fierce and implacable 
adversary to be resisted in a struggle to the death.”24 While Europeans such as the 
Hapsburgs and the Hungarians were not completely lionized, the traditional polemical 
assumptions were clearly at work in the writings of Tapié.
 In sharp contrast to the works of Tapié, Martin Luther, the Türkenbüchlein and 
other polemical works, the writings of those personally familiar with the Turks took a 
much more open minded and accepting view of what had traditionally been viewed as the 
enemy.  Despite Said’s hypothesis that European domination of the Middle East reached 
back as far as the early fourteenth century,25 many of the writings of the seventeenth 
century reflected a very different reality.  Not only were the attempts at domination not 
present, but the accounts of those familiar with the Turks often expressed admiration, a 
desire for emulation in certain respects and a desire for peaceful contact and trade.  While 
this type of writing was not the sole voice of Europeans in the seventeenth century, it was 
12
 24 Victor- L Tapié, The Rise and Fall of the Habsburg Monarchy, trans. Stephen Hardman (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), 22-23.
 25 Said, 49-50.
common enough that it must be considered part of the larger picture of European-
Ottoman relations. 
 The majority of the works that broke from the polemical view and expressed 
admiration were the letters and reports of ambassadors and diplomatic staff.  In particular 
the direct reports to superiors and sovereigns tended to express admiration and 
acceptance.  In works intended for publication in the seventeenth century, the writers 
tended towards a combination of polemical and accepting viewpoints.  This dichotomy 
reflects what seems to be a split between the political reality faced by seventeenth century 
rulers. First, that the Ottoman Empire was a significant imperial power in its own right, 
and it was necessary for European powers to treat itseriously, and also a sop to the 
internal politics of their own nations, where ‘the Turk’ is in many ways a symbol of a 
religious enemy intent on the destruction of the Christian way of life.26   
 These conceptually mixed accounts, such as those Rycaut and others, did reflect 
some aspects of Said’s thesis, as they often illustrated the desire for domination of the 
Ottomans, but unlike the polemical accounts, they stress worldly military intervention.  
However, they also often acknowledged the political realities of Europe and the Ottoman 
Empire and, usually regretfully, acknowledged that conquering the Ottoman empire was 
not feasible.  Instead some, particularly Paul Rycaut, acknowledged the need for Ottoman 
trade in order to support the efforts of individual European nations against each other.  
 These accounts often straddled a line between political reality and faith-based 
discourse, and produced a conclusion that often displeased the author on the basis of 
13
 26  This view is supported by Franklin Baumer, “England, the Turk, and the Common Corps of 
Christendom.” The American Historical Review 50 (Oct, 1944), 26-48.
faith, but reflected the necessities of diplomacy, trade and military power.  Most modern 
theories of the other were somewhat applicable to these types of accounts, though some 
positions, such as Said’s assumption of European domination, were clearly not supported 
by the primary accounts.  In Imaging the World, O.R. Dathorne certainly touched on the 
concept of otherness in terms of faith, as he emphasized the tendency of accounts to 
promote “the difference between the self-righteous ‘us’ and the pagan ‘them.’”27  Indeed, 
Dathorne stressed this idea, and suggested that the strangeness of others in travel 
accounts and myths was often connected a sense of evil.28  This sense of the other as 
inherently, if sometimes subtly, evil was an example of a potential class of theory that 
could be used to justify the primacy of polemical accounts.  Another scholar of travel 
writing and communities, Benedict Anderson touched on the importance of nationalism 
in his work, Imagined Communities.   Anderson examined the roots of nationalism, and 
his thoughts on the relevance of fear and hatred of the other were indeed important to the 
study of the concept of the other.29  While Anderson did tend toward the extreme and tied 
racism to exclusively to European domination, he also provided useful theoretical 
discourse by associating it with repression and domination.30  This again tied into 
European fear of domination by the Ottomans, and indeed, all infidels or pagans in the 
14
 27 O.R. Dathorne, Imagining the World, Mythical Belief versus Reality in Global Encounters 
(Westport: Bergin & Garvey, 1994), 8.
 28 Dathorne, 20.
 29 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), 141.
 30 Anderson, 150.
tradition of Christian historiography as well as the desire for some measure of security 
against such threats.
 The letters of European merchants who did business in the Ottoman Empire, 
particularly the Levant, tended more toward a mixture of admiration and a polemical 
rhetoric, most likely largely due to a need for patrons or a lack of security in their 
position.  Of course, the letters of merchants, especially those published for a wider 
audience in the seventeenth century, were more likely to be polemical in nature than not.  
However, many are a puzzling, contradictory mix of admiration and contempt, perhaps 
because of a need to insert polemical references to satisfy the intended audience.  One of 
the significant problems with the historiography of the early modern period is that, like 
Said, historians often assumed a power imbalance that does not exist.  European 
dominance over others is so engrained in nineteenth and twentieth century minds that 
only rarely were other circumstances even contemplated.  The conflicts between the 
Ottoman Empire and Christian Europe, however, did not show any signs of European 
dominance.  At times, particularly in the fifteenth and early sixteenth century after the fall 
of Constantinople and the conquest of the Balkans, the power imbalance leaned toward 
the Ottoman Empire rather than the Europeans.  However, for most of the early modern 
period, the balance between Ottoman and Christian moved back and forth between them.  
Between the stalemate across the divided Hungary and intermittent and indecisive 
conflict in the Mediterranean, it was clear that neither side could maintain lasting victory 
or dominance over the other.  While rhetoric on both sides claimed ascendency, neither 
side was able to put such claims into practice.
15
 In the following chapters this thesis will examine significant polemical accounts 
and alternatives to the polemical accounts. First it will trace the evolution of the 
polemical sources from the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and tie them 
into the political landscape of the time.  Additionally, it will trace some of the roots of the 
polemical tradition to some of their influences.  Next, it will examine a selection of the 
non-polemical views and address some of the reasons why such material differs from the 
polemical viewpoint and the insight they offer into European-Ottoman relations. In 
addition to the European sources, several Muslims sources will be addressed, as they 
demonstrate significant parallels and commonalities with the European materials.
16
Chapter 2: European Polemical Views
 The polemical arguments against the Ottomans were part of extensive tradition 
that dated back to some of the earliest works of the Christian church.  The authors of the 
polemical writings often drew upon the traditions established by Church writers such as 
Paulus Orosius, who established the idea that non-Christians were instruments acting 
according to the will of God, either as warnings or punishments for the sins of Christians.  
In this vein, it was only through God’s will that the pagans, and their contemporary 
counterparts, the Turks, could be stopped or destroyed. Luther himself frequently 
acknowledged that only God’s direct intervention could save Christians from the Turks, 
and that it required Christians be faithful and free of sin.31 While Martin Luther and other 
religious authors, such as the clergy involved in the production of the Türkenbüchlein, 
were heirs to this tradition of pagan enmity, they were also heavily influenced by the 
military and political reality of their own times, which galvanized them and lent weight to 
the theoretical claims of the Christian historiographical tradition.  While their calls for the 
destruction of the Turks were rooted in the traditions started by Orosius, their fervor was 
instigated by the common and very real fear of Turkish military successes on the borders 
of the Hapsburg Empire.
 As such, the religious accounts were just as much a product of the military and 
political context of early modern Europe as they were of religious and historiographical 
tradition. Without the influence of military polemics and reports of Christian losses on the 
 31 Luther, 27-8, 419-20.
battlefield, the religious polemics would not have held as much purchase on the minds of 
early modern Europeans.  The military success of the Ottoman Empire within the 
Christian sphere of influence galvanized the polemical accounts and instilled a greater 
level of fear among the populace, which made them much more receptive to polemical 
rhetoric.  While first hand accounts from soldiers defeated on the battlefield were rare and 
often lost, some famous accounts have survived, and were supplemented by broadsheets, 
records of sermons, as well as letters and newspaper accounts that were translated and 
reprinted across Europe.
 One of the earliest polemical accounts against the Ottomans was Memoirs of a 
Janissary, written by Konstantin Mihailovic, a Serbian soldier captured at the fall of 
Novo Brdo in July of 1455.  The fall of Novo Brdo was part of a Turkish re-conquest of 
Serbia after Hungarian aid briefly allowed them to assert their independence, and was the 
focus of Ottoman campaigns both before and after the fall of Constantinople in 1453.  
The Turks were briefly defeated at Belgrade by the forces of John Hunyadi of Hungary, 
but successfully re-conquered Serbia in 1459.32   Mihailovic claimed to have been part of 
the Serbian contingent sent to aid in the siege of Constantinople in 1453.33 He managed 
to escape the fall of the city and returned to Serbia, where he continued to serve in the 
Serbian army until his capture in July of 1455.
 After his capture, Mihailovic also claimed to have conscripted as a janissary and 
been part of the Ottoman campaigns against Belgrade in 1456, in the campaign against 
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Trebizond, against Wallachia and its ruler, Vlad Drakul, and in the Bosnian campaign of 
1463.  He was part of the garrison in the fortress of Zvecaj in Bosnia, which was 
subsequently captured by King Matthew Corvinus of Hungary.  Following this battle, 
Mihailovic was able to return to Christian lands and publish the Memoirs.34  In 
Mihailovic’s writings we find one of the more extreme polemics against the Turks, 
despite his own service to them.  The confrontation and antagonistic nature of the text 
was emphasized by his commitment to the destruction of the Turks and his advice to 
Christian rulers was to unite and wipe the Turks out entirely.  For Mihailovic, domination 
of the Ottomans in the form of conquest was not sufficient.  His personal experiences at 
the fall of Constantinople and the defeat of his own people as well as his own capture at 
Novo Brdo intensified the fear that informed his account.  The severity of Mihailovic’s 
polemic suggested that the destruction of those that had dominated him and his people 
was the only response he found appropriate.
 Despite the title of the Memoirs, it is extremely unlikely Mihailovic was a 
janissary,35 as he takes part in the Ottoman siege of Belgrade less than a year after his 
capture.36   While captured soldiers were often forcibly conscripted into the janissaries 
during the establishment of the institution in the early thirteenth century, by the 
fourteenth and especially the fifteenth century, this practice had been discontinued.  
Instead, the janissaries were drawn solely from the devshirme, a tax on Christian families 
in Ottoman lands in the form of young boys approximately ten to twelve years of age, 
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who were taken from their families, educated in the Islamic faith for several years, used 
as palace servants, and only then trained as personal soldiers of the sultan.  The entire 
process averaged eight to ten years, and the janissary corps was considered the elite core 
of the Ottoman army.  The elite nature of the corps was perhaps what led Mihailovic to 
exaggerate his own role within it.  Additionally, he could find some measure of 
comradeship with a group of military men who were at least born to and, at least initially, 
raised by Christian families.
 In terms of the Ottoman military, the janissary corps was traditionally a solid, 
disciplined center in what was an otherwise undisciplined but highly effective army.  Well  
drilled and well equipped with modern firearms equal to those employed by European 
nations, the janissaries were a respected and feared military force.  Strategically, the 
janissaries formed the center of the Ottoman armies and provided a solid base which 
supported and protected the light cavalry units that formed the offensive wings of the 
Ottoman armies.  However, by the end of the sixteenth century, the janissaries had 
become an established part of the Ottoman government, and their military edge had 
begun to decline in the self realization of their own political power.  This decline was not 
always visible to European eyes, however, as accounts from sixteenth century travelers 
often praised their abilities and discipline.  Indeed, in his Turkish Letters, Ogier Ghiselin 
de Busbecq was quite in awe of their discipline and bearing, and marveled at their 
kindness and manners.  He described them as guarding “the Christians, Jews, and other 
helpless folk from the attacks of malefactors,”37 and stated, “if I had not been told that 
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they were Janissaries, I could well have believed they were a kind of Turkish monk or the 
members of some kind of sacred association; yet these were the famous Janissaries who 
carry such terror wherever they go.”38  From his remarks, it was clear that Busbecq 
considered the janissaries to something more than a terrifying military force.  As a 
diplomatic representative from the court of Ferdinand I, who at this time was King of 
Bohemia and Hungary, but not yet Holy Roman Empire, Busbecq admired not only their 
military prowess, but their diplomatic abilities, as well as their role, as he saw it, as 
guardians of the populace of the Ottoman Empire, regardless of religion.
 Despite Mihailovic’s uncertain status in the Ottoman army, it is clear from the text 
that he was associated with the janissary corps in some undisclosed fashion, perhaps as a 
messenger or attached to a logistical corps, as he frequently referenced matters of food, 
pay and supplies in his account.  In purely historical terms, the text is not entirely 
reliable, as the first portion consists of Mihailovic’s summary of Ottoman history, which 
is colored both by his hatred of the Ottomans and his poor understanding of the subject.  
The second portion, however, centers on the campaigns Mihailovic participated in from 
1455 to 1463, and was a useful summary of Ottoman military actions he personally 
witnessed and included many first hand observations of Ottoman life and his own 
reactions to it.
 What Mihailovic provided was one of the earliest polemics against the Ottomans, 
or as the title of first chapter refers to the them, “the ignoble heathens.”39  While the first 
portion of the book relates customs, legends and histories that Mihailovic gleaned while 
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living among them, the aim of the work is focused in the later chapters, namely, his first 
hand experience among the Ottoman armies and advice for Christian rulers on how to 
fight and potentially defeat them.  Several of the later chapters dealt with the Ottoman 
organization and tactics in battle, and suggested strategies for defeating them.40  “For it is 
far easier for one to defend himself against the Turks who is familiar with them than for 
one who does not know their customs.”41  His recommendations focused on how armies 
should be equipped to battle the Ottomans, insisting that commanders should leave 
behind any cumbersome equipment and weapons and instead focus on the light cavalry 
tactics practiced by the Tartars and the Turks themselves.42  Mihailovic’s focus on 
military matters was suggestive of his own background as a soldier, though modern 
scholars are uncertain of his social class and education.43 His recommendations do, 
however mesh well with the goals of his work: he clearly saw the Ottomans as a military 
threat to be defeated, and offered his own personal experiences and recommendations as 
a means to that end.
 This view of Mihailovic’s purpose was independently supported by the writings 
of many Renaissance humanists after the fall of Constantinople.  In Creating East and 
West, Nancy Bisaha claimed that many humanists embraced the idea of the Turk as the 
“enemy of civilization” and “the new barbarian.”44 These ideas were reinforced by lurid 
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tales of Ottoman blood-thirst and cruelty during the sacking of Constantinople, despite a 
lack of first hand accounts among the humanists.45  Additionally, she argued that classical 
sources provided a further influence on the humanists, and they came to see the struggle 
against the Ottomans as political and cultural as well as religious.46  While the latter idea 
had potentially little impact on the goals of Mihailovic, his own account could have 
easily influenced the writings of the humanists in the decades after the fall of 
Constantinople.
 Memoirs of a Janissary remained a significant voice in the body of Western 
primary sources on the Ottoman Empire, as it helped to set the traditional tone of 
Christians against the heathen outsiders.  Indeed, Mihailovic presented his text as a call to 
battle against the Ottoman Empire, appealing to Popes, Kings and God to fight the 
enemy.  This final appeal of the text was the most significant, as Konstantin Mihailovic 
plainly set forth his views and goal: “Lord God Almighty, help faithful Christians against 
the ignoble heathens, to wipe them out.  Amen.”47  For Mihailovic, defending Christian 
lands was not enough; he felt that a defensive strategy would barely limit the damage 
caused by Turkish raids and campaigns, and that the only true solution was to crush the 
empire utterly, for “until you smash a snakes head it is always worse.”48  He was quite 
concerned with the damage caused by Turkish campaigns, even unsuccessful ones. He 
claimed that “even if you defeat them sometime on a foray they will do just the same 
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damage as before.”49  To Mihailovic, the Ottomans were an enemy that would not stop, 
one that would keep coming year after year, and slowly erode the defenses of Europe.  
 Mihailovic was also greatly concerned not only with the death and physical 
damage, but also in the conversion of Christians to Islam, which he considered a great 
crime and an utter betrayal.50  This viewpoint is not uncommon in polemical texts, and 
the Christian renegades are generally regarded as worse in most respects than the 
Ottomans themselves.51 In this sense, the polemical texts did address the idea of the 
Ottomans as a religious and moral threat, even when focused on the military threat of the 
Ottoman armies.  As such, the Ottomans were considered a spiritual threat as well as a 
military one, and depending on the source, the possibility of spiritual corruption was even 
worse than the possibility of invasion and death at the hands of the infidel.
 The religious polemics against the Ottomans developed out of this military and 
political situation, as the martial fervor of the men who fought them came back to the rest 
of Europe to influence those who lived in the shadow of Turkish military power.  It was 
telling that anti-Ottoman works such as the Türkenbüchlein did not appear in the German 
lands until after Ottoman campaigns into Hungary in the 1520s, and particularly after the 
defeat at Mohacs in 1526 and the first siege of Vienna in 1529.52 This is reinforced 
significantly by repeated calls for crusades against the Ottomans following the fall of 
Constantinople in 1453, which despite a tradition of moral outrage, produced no tangible 
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results or movement of armies.53  This lack of reaction by kings and powerful states was 
particularly telling, as it suggests that despite the popular sway of religious tracts, other 
influences and concerns kept military action against the Ottomans from becoming a 
reality.   However, despite the lack of military action, some of the nobility saw a use in 
the Türkenbüchlein.  Elector John Frederick of Saxony directed Martin Luther to write 
the Exhortation to Prayer Against the Turk in 1541, as the Elector believed prayer was a 
potent weapon.  Additionally, many clergymen urged their congregations to pray for 
military victory and make voluntary contributions to potential war efforts.54 Despite this, 
German military campaigns remained entirely defensive, even in the face of what seems 
to be a deluge of Türkenbüchlein publications.  The pamphleteers published a wide 
variety of pamphlets throughout the sixteenth century, and several, like the popular 
Project for a Crusade Against the Turks saw multiple printings, including five editions 
from 1518 to 1542 for this particular tract.
 Some of the authors of the Türkenbüchlein were well aware that the princes and 
nobles were not conducting campaigns against the Ottoman enemy.  In 1522, the 
unknown author of the a tract entitled, Türcken biechlin, complained that the nobility 
have become lazy and idle and were not fulfilling their duties as defenders of 
Christendom.55   Similarly, other authors complained that all Christians were failing in 
their duties to God, and that the Turks were a just punishment against the sins of 
Christians.  Martin Luther himself takes up this particular attitude, claiming that prayer is 
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the only true defense against the Turks, and that “our wall and firearms and all the princes 
will probably leave the Turk untouched.”56 While Luther’s comments here seem to be in 
opposition to the idea that the Turks must be destroyed, it must be remembered that he 
also placed the destruction of the Turks solely in the hands of God. As with some of the 
Türkenbüchlein authors, Luther’s comments must be evaluated in terms of the political 
context of his times.  In many ways, given the lack of faith in the nobility expressed by 
his fellow authors of anti-Turkish texts, his comments can be seen as a condemnation of 
German princes as much as a reaction to the Ottomans themselves.
 While the Türkenbüchlein tracts are largely a reaction to the military threat of the 
Turks, they also painted the Ottomans as non-actors, in a long standing tradition of 
Christian historiography. Paulus Orosius, author of The Seven Books of History Against 
the Pagans, who lived from approximately A.D. 375 to 418, focused on the need to prove 
that the pre-Christian and non-Christian activity caused greater suffering than any 
disasters or calamities that took place during the Christian era.  To Orosius, even the 
victories did greater harm than good, “surely bringing no gains but great miseries,” and 
the happiness of the Romans in victory does not outweigh the unhappiness of the peoples 
they conquered.”57 Eusebius of Caesarea, who lived from 263-339, also spends a great 
deal of time emphasizing the idea of the will of God, describing Constantine as the only 
Emperor “to whom God gave convincing proofs of the religion he practiced by the 
26
 56 Luther, 419.
 57 Paulus Orosius, The Seven Books of History Against the Pagans, trans. Roy Deferrari 
(Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1964), 173.
benefits of every kind which were accorded him.”58  This type of argument was an 
interesting counterpoint to the ideas of Orosius, as this argument establishes the idea that 
by withholding proofs from earlier emperors, it was God’s intention and design that they 
be pagan and, by extension, supports their cruelty and persecutions as well. Early 
Christian historians have several traits in common, in particularly the concept of God as 
the “author of all their blessings.”59 This is paralleled by the British historian Bede, 
writing in the late seventh century, who revisited to the idea that the pagans, in this case 
the Saxons, Angles and Jutes, were attacking as part of God’s vengeance upon those that 
stray, and God ordains the acts of the pagans, even if they do not acknowledge 
him.60  
 The importance of these early Christian historians is difficult to ignore, as many 
of their concepts and ideas appear repeatedly throughout Western historiography.   Traces 
of Orosius’ conception of pagans as instruments of God continue throughout the scope of 
European history, as various groups of ‘infidels’ are sent against the Christian West as 
scourges and punishments for the collective sins of Christendom.  For R.G. Collingwood, 
summarizing schools of historiography at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
describes medieval history as the Gesta Dei, the deeds of God.61 Collingwood described 
Eusebius as creating both a universal history as well as a Christian conception of man. To 
Collingwood, the early Christian historiographers were widening their perspective 
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beyond their particular ethnic groups, in contrast to the Greek and Roman historians who 
preceded them, but they were expanding their approach with a pan-ethnic Christian 
historiography.  Furthermore, he described the early Christian historians’ hostility to the 
pagans as a result of the vigor with which they were pursuing a new ideal.62 
 To fully understand the context of the late seventeenth century, it is necessary to 
briefly examine the course of Ottoman history since AD 1400.  Christian victories such as 
the one at Vienna in 1683 were rare occurrences, as Ottoman expansion was more often 
restricted by matters of logistics and supply, limited campaign seasons, internal squabbles 
over succession and threats from the Safavid Empire on their eastern border.63  For the 
first few centuries of their existence, the Ottomans conquered and expanded, with major 
highlights in 1453 with the conquest of Constantinople, the defeat of the Mamluk Empire 
of Egypt in 1517, the Ottoman victory at Mohacs, Hungary in 1526. One major reversal 
of Ottoman victories was the naval battle of Lepanto off the Greek coast in 1571.  It was 
of particular significance since it was the first effective alliance of Christian powers and 
resulted in an Ottoman defeat.  Although the combined forces of the Papacy, Venice and 
Spain failed to capitalize on their victory, they temporarily destroyed the Ottoman fleet.64  
This Papal-sponsored alliance, the first Holy League against the Ottomans, was short-
lived, and accomplished little beyond its immediate objective: the destruction of the 
Ottoman fleet.  By the time the Ottomans and the League signed a peace treaty in 1574, 
the Holy League had achieved nothing more of note.  Even this limited cooperation 
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between Western powers was unusual.  More often, when encouraged to form an alliance 
or gather for crusade in the face of an Ottoman military threat, the Christian nations 
demurred, pleading their own interests.65  Considering this traditional lack of cooperation, 
the Hapsburg-Polish alliance and the creation of a new Holy League which followed the 
siege of Vienna in 1683 was a noteworthy turning point in the political and military 
history of Europe and the Ottoman Empire.  By combining their military forces, the Holy 
League was able to conquer lands, particularly in Hungary, long-held by the Ottoman 
Empire. Individually, few European states were a military match for the large armies 
drawn from the great expanse of territory and population controlled by the Ottomans, 
however, as an allied force, the League was able to defeat the Ottomans in the field and 
ultimately force a treaty that was favorable to some of their interests.
 The Hapsburg-Polish alliance was a necessity in the face of continued Ottoman 
invasions of both Hapsburg Hungary and Polish lands in the 1660s and 1670s.  Both the 
Hapsburgs and the Polish Kings were slowly forced to give ground and surrender 
territory in the face of repeated Ottoman campaigns over the course of two decades.  For 
the Hapsburgs, the crisis was intensified with a revolt against Hapsburg rule in Hungary, 
and as support faded, the leaders of the revolt allied themselves with the Ottomans, and 
with their aid, seized control of Hungary by 1682. Hapsburg efforts were further 
constrained by war with France during this period.  This distraction was ill-timed and it 
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was regarded with significant hostility by contemporary sources, who blamed the French 
for some of the events leading up to the siege of Vienna. 
  With Fier [sic] and Sword, they laid all waste:
  No Quarter gave for Seven Year,
  Then Brought the Turk to Burn the rest.66 
 Even some Frenchmen were disgusted by the actions of the French against their 
fellow Christians.  Dumont, a merchant traveling in Istanbul in the 1670s, claims that the 
Turks “usually treat Christians with intolerable Insolence, except the French, whom they 
call their Friends and Allies.”67  He found that his Ottoman hosts were “extremely pleas’d 
with how much Ardour the French espous'd their Interests; and since that time have 
look'd more favourably upon our Countrymen than before. 'Tis true that they have been 
of late so much oblig'd to France.”68  Despite his displeasure, and whatever the source of 
his distance from French policy, Dumont was well aware of the close nature of the 
Franco-Ottoman alliance, and he referred to a French diversion to draw Hapsburg forces 
away from the Ottoman’s Hungarian campaign.  Even after a peace treaty in 1679, France 
still caused a great deal of difficulty for the Hapsburg Empire.  During the Hapsburg 
attempt to raise money for troops and supplies to fight the Turks, the French ambassador 
caused many problems for Emperor Leopold, demanding concessions and payments, and 
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even threatened the Empire with a war on two fronts. This caused further unrest among 
the German Elector Princes, and further slowed the muster of troops.69  These actions 
complicated the efforts of the Hapsburgs, even after the expiration of a formal French-
Ottoman alliance. French aggression also complicated their military situation by dividing 
and diffusing the efforts of anti-Ottoman polemics.  With the French as a credible threat 
and complicating both the polemical propaganda as well as exacerbating old national 
grudges as well as confessional conflict, a united effort against the Ottomans was made 
more difficult for the German princes and people.
 On the thirteenth day of September, AD 1683, King John III Sobieski of Poland 
was ensconced in the captured tent of the Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha of the 
Ottoman Empire, engaged in a spate of letter-writing.70  The relief forces of the Polish 
King had defeated the Ottoman siege of Vienna the previous day, and the combined 
Polish and Hapsburg armies were reforming their order of battle, burying or burning the 
dead, and looting the Turkish camp.71  In the midst of this correspondence, the Polish 
King and other commanders laid the groundwork for the pursuit of the Ottoman army, led 
by Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha.  King Sobieski was an experienced veteran of wars 
with the Turks, and was determined to drive them from Christian lands.  In a speech 
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purportedly given to his army before the battle on September the twelfth, Sobieski 
described his people as “consider’d as the Bulwark of Christianity against the Arms of 
the Ottomans.”  In this speech, he further described the need to defend the Hapsburg 
Empire and the “cause of God” who would “undoubtedly fight for us.”72  The 
preservation of the Hapsburg Empire would prevent further loss to Poland and the rest of 
Europe by blocking a potential invasion route, and their duty to God would be upheld.  It 
was this marriage of practical defense and religious duty that characterized John Sobieski 
and many other nobles involved in the late seventeenth century campaigns against the 
Ottomans.73  This sense of responsibility laid the foundation for the Holy League against 
the Ottomans.  The combined forces of this League, created by the Papacy in March of 
1684, originally included the Hapsburg Empire, Poland and Venice, and they were later 
joined by Russia.74  Sobieski’s writings were also some of the most influential polemical 
accounts of the period. As a military leader and politician, he was aware of the value of 
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moral and propaganda. As his letters were publicly reprinted across Europe, they 
provided motivation for soldiers and nobles against Sobieski’s Ottoman enemies.
 In Poland, John Sobieski proved his worth as a general in 1673 by raising an army 
and crushing a Turkish offensive.  Shortly thereafter, he was elected King of Poland by 
the Polish Diet. From the beginning of his reign, Sobieski was forced to deal with 
domestic problems while he fought the Turks to a standstill.75  In March of 1683, both the 
Hapsburg Emperor, Leopold I, and King Sobieski received word that the Ottomans staged 
a massive army outside Belgrade in preparation for a new campaign.  Both rulers were 
uncertain about the target of the Ottoman campaign, and after a great deal of complex 
negotiation, they agreed to a defensive pact.76
 By July of 1683, the Ottoman army had smashed its way through Hungary and 
laid siege to Vienna.  In both Poland and the Holy Roman Empire, the inefficient 
governmental system had slowed preparations, particularly in accessing necessary funds 
for the war effort.77  Ultimately, however, Sobieski and his forces arrived before the fall 
of Vienna and they smashed into the Turkish camps like a thunderbolt, panicking and 
driving the Turkish forces off so suddenly that they had little time to take or destroy the 
vast multitude of their supplies.  This included, among other war material, some 400,000 
pounds each of lead and powder for guns, 20,000 hand grenades, and 262 operational 
artillery pieces and cannons out of 334.78  The sudden rout, combined with the lack of 
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supplies, left retreat as the only option available to the Ottoman army.  By December, the 
combined forces of Leopold I and John III Sobieski had driven the Turks out of Austria 
and reclaimed much of Northwestern Hungary.79  In doing so, Sobieski and the armies of 
Leopold had proven that a united Christian force could effectively match the 
effectiveness of an Ottoman army approximately twice its size.80  The polemical tone of 
Sobieski’s letters and speeches were now firmly positive, raising hope of European 
domination of the Ottomans, rising above the potential for a crushing defeat at Vienna.
 The victory at Vienna was so sudden and overwhelming that some among the 
victors could scarcely believe it, ascribing it solely to the power of God.  One officer in 
the Imperial Army wrote that, considering the “advantageous situation and opportunities 
the Enemy had to prevent our Relief, as the shameful flight they soon betook themselves 
unto: ‘Tis plain that nothing but God Almighty could have brought such Infatuation upon 
them.”81  This was understandable given the magnitude of the Turkish army, numbered at 
approximately 150,000 men, while the relief force and garrison together only numbered 
approximately 75,000.  The relief force had attacked the reserve units in the camp 
surrounding the earthworks and trenches outside the city.  The battle turned decisively 
during the afternoon of the day long struggle when the Ottoman troops within the 
earthworks fled rather than reinforce or assist their embattled reserves.82  That the 
normally disciplined Ottoman army would flee so readily and easily could only be 
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explained to many on the Christian side as an act of God.  Even experienced commanders 
were surprised by this unlikely turn of events, as the King of Poland wrote: “God has 
blest us with so signal a victory as scarce the memory of man can equal.”83  Sobieski was 
quite willing to gloat over the fallen foe as well, as he described the great “herd of 
Turkish Captives... My Ears charmed with so pleasing music, as the howling and dying 
groans of these miserable wretches.”84 Sobieski’s letters were largely of this style, 
creating an image of a fierce protector of Christendom who relished the defeat of his 
infidel enemy.  It could be supposed that this was an accurate reflection of his character 
given his history of conflict against the Ottomans in Poland, but it was also excellent 
material for a propaganda campaign.  Given that many of his letters and speeches were 
transcribed and reprinted in newspapers across the continent and ultimately reprinted by 
private publishers in London within a few years of the siege of Vienna, it was clear that 
the message of Sobieski was spread throughout the Christian kingdoms of Europe.
 According to Rhoads Murphey, a military historian whose Ottoman Warfare 
1500-1700 was an extensive survey of the composition, logistics and sustainability of the 
Ottoman military, Ottoman historians lay the blame for the defeat at Vienna squarely on 
the head of Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa. It was not simply a matter of failed leadership, 
but a matter of morale.  The Christian sources make clear that the Vizier hoarded great 
wealth within in his tent, but according to Ottoman sources, he had neglected the 
customary practice of disbursing “confidence-building and morale-boosting favours and 
bonuses,” and this led directly to the “collective loss of the soldiers’ will to persevere 
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when the Ottoman army was perched on the threshold of unprecedented success.”85  
While money was a common motivation on both sides, the Christian commanders could 
not have imagined this particular practice to be the guiding hand of their inspired victory.  
After all, in their experience, sharing the spoils of war among the army usually 
encouraged desertion rather than loyalty, as a rich man was less likely to risk life and 
wealth in pursuit of more when he could preserve both by returning home.
 The sudden and unexpected victory at Vienna provided an opportunity for the 
Christian nations, as they were able to launch an offensive campaign on the Turkish 
controlled areas of Hungary and into the Balkans. They were supported in this endeavor 
by the Pope, to whom Sobieski had sent the captured banner of the Turkish army as a 
trophy following the victory at Vienna with a special envoy.  This envoy, the Abbot 
d’Henoff, declared to the Pope that Sobieski was “designed of God to be the Defender of 
the Christian Religion” and acknowledged Papal support through both “prayers” and 
“treasures.”86  This was the groundwork for the Holy League against the Ottomans, 
inspired and guided by Pope Innocent XI.  The alliance of necessity between the Polish 
and Hapsburg campaign was expanded to include the Venetians.87  With additional 
resources and manpower, the Holy League bolstered its faltering advance into Turkish 
controlled areas of Hungary.  Of particular importance was the re-conquest of Buda on 
September 2nd, 1686, as Tapié asserted, the importance to Europe at the time and the 
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prestige the city was reinforced by the “inscription still visible on the walls of the ancient 
citadel, Buda e servitude in libertatem restituta.”88  Russia joined the League in 1686, and 
further widened the coalition’s support and efforts. The proactive campaigns of the Holy 
League continued until the sixth of September 1688, with the conquest of Belgrade in 
Serbia, a fortress-city that had been a common mustering point for Ottoman armies.89  
 The Holy League’s acceptance of Russia into their ranks was odd for two reasons.  
First, it was the first real acceptance of Russia as a European power, albeit a backwards 
and underdeveloped one.  While it had been a trading partner for centuries, it had not 
been properly integrated into the community of nations.  Secondly, while the Polish and 
Venetians were solidly Catholic, and the Hapsburg nominally so, the Orthodox Russian 
state was a departure for the Papal-backed Holy League.  Once again, the practical needs 
of the military situation demanded a different approach, and the Orthodox was anything 
but the significant threat posed by Turkish Muslims.  Furthermore, the Russians brought a 
great deal of grain and other supplies as well as light cavalry to match the Turkish armies.  
For Russia’s part, they hoped to gain access to the Black Sea and its trade routes, long 
dominated by the Ottomans and their subject peoples.90
 The 1690s were marked by several Ottoman counteroffensives, all but one of 
which ended disastrously for them.  The 1690 re-conquest of Serbia succeeded in 
capturing Belgrade, but most of the campaigns in this period were either inconclusive, or 
like the Battles of Szalánkemen and Zenta, military disasters for the Ottomans.  In 1699, 
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the Treaty of Karlowitz effectively ended Turkish ambitions in Hungary and brought 
relative peace to the region, and gave the Hapsburgs dominion over most of Hungary and 
Transylvania.  Venice gained territory in Greece, Russia gained a small area of Ottoman 
territory around the Sea of Azoz91, and Poland regained territory lost in their wars with 
the Ottomans in the 1670s.  The treaty marked a significant decline in Ottoman power, 
though they managed to keep possession of Belgrade.92  
 The battles of the seventeenth century were marked by a relative parity of 
weapons, but an adaptation to Turkish tactics.  Previously, the light cavalry of the Turkish 
armies had proven a significant advantage in their wars against the European armies.  
With the addition of the Polish and Russian armies, as well as their auxiliary forces such 
as the Cossacks, the gap in tactical and strategic units lessened considerably.  
Furthermore, the great fields of the Ukraine, split between Russia and Poland, were an 
Ottoman objective, as the massive grain supply produced by the region was a key to 
supporting the massive number of horses required by the Ottoman method of war.  With 
both nations at war with them, the Ottomans were forced to rely on Egypt to supply their 
forces, a supply line that stretched hundreds of miles to the European front.
 While the campaigns of the Holy League marked a significant change in the 
balance of military power in the region, they fell far short of the goals set by their leaders. 
In a letter to Pope Innocent XI in 1684, King Sobieski declared he would conquer 
Belgrade and then “March on even to the Imperial City of the of the Turks and correct the 
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unbridled presumption of the Barbarians.”93  While he did achieve his first objective, 
League forces never approached the Turkish capital.  Domestic problems within Poland, 
which he also referred to in this letter, calling it “Civil Dissension,” occupied more of his 
time and pulled him away from the battlefield.  In fact, the problems of internal revolt 
and political difficulties with the Polish National Diet were likely a symptom of his 
constant campaigning.  Ultimately, Poland saw little gain for its efforts against the Turks, 
and only regained a small territory on its southern frontier, lost decades before.  Sobieski 
did not even see this minor gain for all his efforts. Increasingly marginalized by a jealous 
Emperor Leopold and distracted by domestic problems, Sobieski died in 1696, three 
years before the Treaty of Karlowitz restored the lost Polish territory of Podolia.94  
Unfortunately for this great general, he did not die in battle, but apparently of an 
apoplectic fit brought on by his frustration with his ministers and the domestic political 
situation within Poland.95
 In 1699, the Treaty of Karlowitz created new ideas along the Ottoman frontier, 
primarily a sense of a permanent peace treaty, rather than the temporary cessation of 
hostilities that had distinguished past Ottoman treaties.  The creation of joint border 
commissions accompanied this new sense of peace, and the treaty closed the borders and 
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clearly plotted a boundary between nations.96  While this was not what many of the 
European leaders wanted, in the long run it served their interests better than the 
extermination of the Ottomans would have. Despite some internal resistance to the 
closure of the borders, the Ottoman Empire scrupulously adhered to the limits of the 
treaty, suppressing those elements of its population that raided across or otherwise 
violated the borders established by treaty.97  As the eighteenth century progressed, the 
Ottomans would have cause to regret their strict adherence to their treaty obligations, as 
the European powers used the more favorable balance of military power and the 
obligation of these and later treaties against the Empire to their advantage.  By the 
nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was economically a puppet state of European 
powers, as European companies and trading concerns dominated the financial and 
political policy of the Empire.  
 For the Christian powers, after nearly three centuries of continued conflict with 
the Ottoman Empire, the Treaty of Karlowitz had achieved one of their primary goals.  
They had soundly defeated and turned back the Ottoman Turks, and reclaimed formerly 
Christian lands.  This was not a minor or temporary success on a small Mediterranean 
island or a makeshift truce marking a pause in hostilities while both sides dealt with 
matters elsewhere. The last twenty years of the seventeenth century were a departure 
from precedent. Victory for the European powers had often been a matter of holding out 
until the strains of logistics and the seasons brought the Ottoman campaign season to an 
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end. Now the Europeans had accomplished a significant conquest in the face of formerly 
overwhelming odds.  The balance of power between the European powers and the 
Ottoman Empire had begun to shift, and voices such as Sobieski could now express 
triumph as well as fear.  The territorial gains accomplished by the Treaty of Karlowitz 
were not simply temporary gains that would only last for as long as they could hold them.  
They were significant advantages, and thanks to the Ottoman acceptance and willingness 
to adhere to its treaties, it would require a formal act of war to regain those lands.  Such 
an act would also subject the violator of the treaty to fines and penalties assessed by other 
nations.  In short, the Ottoman acceptance of the treaty system marked the end of their 
status as a fully free and expansionist state and instead accepted a limited status of a 
pseudo-European state, with all of the obligations and few of the advantages.  This 
particular aspect of the European victory was unlooked for, but it was a matter of 
profound consequence for the entire region.
 In light of Sobieski’s grand vow to march on the gates of Istanbul, the Treaty of 
Karlowitz can be seen as a failure of both intent and effort.  In truth, the Ottoman Empire, 
though weakened by its losses during the campaigns of the Holy League, was still a 
strong and extensive state, and the Sultans still retained most of the authority they would 
lose over the century to come.  A final defeat of the Ottoman Empire was not possible for 
the members of the Holy League, particularly since their internal conflicts and rivalries 
with other neighbors had grown as they focused their attention on the Ottomans.  With 
Sobieski’s death in 1696, the Polish nobility elected a new King in Poland, of Saxon 
extraction and he focused his attention on the Great Northern War against Sweden.  The 
41
French-Hapsburg rivalry was once again in full flower with the War of Spanish 
Succession, and the Venetians intently avoided the crossfire in the battlegrounds of 
Northern Italy.  In Russia, Peter the Great set about to reform his nation and nearly 
dragged it down in wars with Sweden and Poland.98  The practical considerations of 
politics trumped the grand religious ideals that were bound up in the Holy League.  
 However, while the League did not live up to the intent or ideals of some of its 
leaders, it did accomplish an unprecedented task.  The primary gains of the alliance lay in 
the impressive series of defeats achieved against an enemy that had often seemed 
unbeatable.  The Hapsburgs in particular gained a major advantage with the recovery of 
Hungary from Ottoman hands: the gateway to the Hapsburg heartlands and seat of power 
was now closed off by a well-fortified buffer state. Although the Ottomans would attack 
the European states again in the eighteenth century, it would never regain its former glory 
and slowly lost more European territory to increasingly unfavorable treaties.  
 While European polemical views of the Ottomans were the result of long standing 
trends in military and religious thought, they combined to form a lasting impression of a 
society with an entrenched polemical view of Ottomans and Muslims that has been part 
of the historiography of European-Ottoman relations to the twenty-first century.  The 
problem created by this viewpoint has been that it was often considered to be the only 
viewpoint, or at least the only one worth considering.  Combined with assumptions of 
European dominance and superiority and nineteenth century historiographical and 
philosophical thought that non-westerners lack history, it was easy for many historians to 
42
 98  Dupuy and Dupuy, 676, 705 and 707.
come to the conclusion that European dominance was a given, and the polemical rhetoric 
was the only voice within the source material.  This situation was exacerbated by the long 
standing Christian historiographical tradition that non-Christians had no ability to act on 
their own; they were instead simply tools in the hands of God.  As both non-westerners 
and non-Christians, the default idea of an Ottoman Turk was immediately caught coming 
and going, despite the reality that such an individual may very well have been neither 
Muslim nor Turkish.  
 Even after the Ottoman conquest of the Mamluk empire in the early sixteenth 
century, much of the interaction between the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires took place 
in Hungary and Ottoman-held lands in the Balkans. Given the necessity of trade across 
the borderlands of Hungary in times of relative peace, particularly of Hungarian beef 
cattle,99 interactions involved regular trade between factors operating on behalf of 
merchants living in Ottoman and Hapsburg lands, and the movement of over 150,000 
animals across the border zone in 1580s.100  This volume of trade, coupled with the 
existence of first hand accounts that contradict the polemical view, provided the basis for 
alternatives to the polemical viewpoint.
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Chapter 3: Alternatives to the Polemical Views
 While the polemical writings formed a large branch of the traditional 
historiography of Ottoman-European relations, in recent years other sources have come to 
the attention of historians.  While some, like Paul Rycaut and Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq 
were rather well-known in historical circles, the diverse array of travel writers, diplomats 
and other individuals remained largely unknown.  This oversight has been largely 
unfortunate, as their writings contained a great deal of information and first hand 
observations about both the Ottoman Empire and the observers themselves.  In many 
ways these sources were a break from the traditional polemical view and granted a great 
deal of potential insight into the interactions between European and Ottoman powers. 
They also show the Ottoman Empire as an important part of Europe and European 
politics as well as an entity in its own right.
 Despite a long history of mutual antagonism, there was often a great deal of 
similarity between the writings of Christian and Muslim travelers in the seventeenth 
century.  Individual writers on both sides of the religious divide would, in general, 
display their hostility and contempt for the other group, while at times acknowledging 
some scant virtue to be found despite the other group’s religion.  While both groups 
traveled for some of the same reasons, particularly trade and diplomatic affairs, the body 
of Islamic travel literature takes on an additional dimension, that of the religious scholar. 
It was not uncommon for religious scholars to come to Europe expressly to debate 
matters of religion with Christians, or at the very least, fold those debates into part of 
their purpose in Europe.  While educated Christian travelers would, at best, look at Islam 
as aberrant practice to be observed or denigrated for its negative effects on what others 
believed to be a salutary people, Muslim travelers saw Christianity as something to be 
challenged and engaged, often by scholarly debate, as well as a concept they could use to 
define themselves in opposition.  At their root, Christian and Muslim travel accounts 
engaged many of the same biases, misunderstandings and complicated social 
connections, but Muslim accounts had a special form of religious travel accounts, which 
actively sought peaceful opposition and provided a unique insight into Muslim travelers 
in Christian lands.
 The travel accounts of Christians and Muslims contained a great deal of common 
ground, most of which was reflected in their shared humanity and in particular their 
mutual animosity. The accounts provided a significant amount of insight into the 
similarities of culture, at least among travelers and diplomats, despite religious and social 
factors.   What was striking about the accounts was that often the animosity was not 
always as strong as might be expected, and almost despite the intentions of some authors, 
positive descriptions of the other seemed to slip into the text.  While these accounts had 
widely varying intended audiences, the real influence seems to have been the 
unconscious mind of the authors, as their hesitations and confusion over the complexities 
facing them were often evident in the text despite their own attitudes.  Paul Rycaut is one 
such example, since despite his personal dislike of the Turks, he was unable to separate 
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the political and economic needs of the British empire and urged the declaration of war 
that seemed to be his true desire.101 
 While many of the Muslim accounts did not contain the same naked hostility 
toward Christians that can be found in the Christian accounts, many of them, particularly 
al-Ghassani’s and Evliya Çelebi’s, reflected the hostility between the two groups and the 
reality of a history of warfare between them.  On the other hand, the accounts of Qasim 
and Aisha expressed a great deal of interconnectedness and friendships that reach beyond 
the boundaries of country and religion, and shared a significant amount of interaction, 
trade and cooperation between individuals of different backgrounds.  In the writings of 
Qasim in particular, the desire to confront and condemn the other seems to be subdued by 
a desire to teach and learn.  While the hallmarks of assumed cultural superiority remain, 
the difference in approach was notable for its intentions if not its concrete results.  Other 
authors were also confronted with a more complicated reality as well, often torn, as 
Rycaut was, between his dislike of Muslims as a people and other needs and concerns 
whether they were political, social or economic.  Even Evliya Çelebi, despite his often 
dismissive views of Christians, was accused by his contemporaries of being too soft on 
and too accepting of individual Christians.102  The reality of seventeenth century travel 
writing seemed have echoed to the complicated nature of a turbulent time, where no 
conflict or venture of cooperation was permanent or straightforward, but rather a morass 
of shifting needs and temporary accommodations with the other, one’s society and one’s 
self.
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 The overlap of Christian and Muslim attitudes within sixteenth and seventeenth 
century sources was quite unlikely to be a coincidence.  In general, however, these were 
educated men who travelled between the same spheres of influence: whether they were 
Christians entering Muslim-held lands or Muslims entering Christian-held lands, they 
travelled by much the same means and with a great deal of commonality of experience. It 
would be a greater stretch of the imagination if they were unable to find any common 
experiences, as both groups experienced the other as outsiders. 
 As parallels go, it was relatively easy to detect the similarities between Christian 
and Muslim travel writing.  A natural criticism of the other seems to be embedded in the 
thought processes of both groups, and often reflected how different the other group is 
from the observer’s customs and traditions.  A particular case in point comes from the 
writings of Evliya Çelebi, a well-to-do man known for his extensive travels within the 
Ottoman Empire in the late seventeenth century, who carried out various tasks for his 
patron, Melek Ahmed Pasha.   At one point in the accounts of his travels in the Balkans, 
he interjects his opinions on the Austrians and the Hungarians, pointing out that despite 
the catechism that “unbelievers are a single community,”103 the Catholic Austrians and 
Protestant Hungarians had some significant differences.  He made a great deal of the 
Hungarians’ hospitality, skill as warriors and cleanliness, and remarked that their frontier 
warriors look just like Ottoman frontier warriors, and ultimately, “though both of them 
are unbelievers without faith, the Hungarians are more honorable and cleaner infidels.”104  
This was somewhat surprising as the late 1650s and early 1660s were marked by a 
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significant war between the Ottoman Empire and Hungary, in which the Turks were 
ultimately defeated and repulsed.  Perhaps it was a matter of admiration for a successful 
foe, but his words showed a surprising lack of bitterness towards a recent enemy.
 Often, however, Evliya Çelebi was openly critical of Christians, blaming them for 
the banditry endemic in Albania, stressing the need to reinforced defenses against 
Christian nations, or, in one case, raze a castle so it could not be used against the 
Ottomans.105  However, given the hostility between the Ottoman Empire and Christian 
nations in the 1660s and 1670s, when Evliya Çelebi was writing his account, his distrust 
of Christians could be considered quite natural.  In 1670 he was recruiting men as 
soldiers and workmen to reinforce and rebuild the fortress of Zarnata in Greece.  
Comparatively, however, Evliya Çelebi’s tone was almost reasonable for the time, as 
many voices on both sides of the Christian-Muslim conflict were significantly more 
agitated.  From the Christian perspective, travel accounts and important public figures 
had called for the destruction of the enemy, or condemned them as unworthy in some 
fashion.  In Europe, distinguished voices such as Martin Luther called out for the 
destruction of the Turks, dismissing them as unworthy infidels whom God would 
destroy.106  In the Muslim world as well, authors often expressed disdain and contempt 
for their enemies.  The great Muslim traveler, Ibn Battuta, casually dismissed Russian 
Christians as “an ugly and perfidious people.”107 Despite the religious and cultural 
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differences of Europeans and Ottomans, a disdain for the other was a mindset often 
shared by both.
 In 1686, the writings of John Chardin referenced the unrestrained enthusiasm of 
the Venetian ambassador for Turkish policy and education, to the point that the 
ambassador assured Chardin that he would send his own son to the Ottoman Court.108  In 
1699, this enthusiasm is matched by the letters of Abdallah bin Aisha.  Aisha was a 
member of a Moroccan delegation to sent to negotiate a treaty with France, in order to 
arrange the exchange of Christian and Muslim prisoners.109  Upon his return he described 
to his lord, Mulay Ismail, then ruler of Morocco, the natural goodness of the French 
people and encouraged trade and good relations between Morocco and France.110 
Although his original negotiations failed, Aisha maintained several contacts in France, 
wrote to them often, and attempted to negotiate trade deals and even a marriage between 
his lord, Mulay Ismail, and the Princess de Conti, one of the daughters of King Louis 
XIV.  In doing so, he promised that “she will retain her religion and the customs of her 
predecessors, and she will not experience anything unsatisfactory in all her affairs.”111  
While this was to some degree political flattery to encourage a diplomatic tie, Aisha was 
also conducting personal business with his factor in the same letter, encouraging national 
as well as personal trade, and trusting that agent with the delivery of diplomatic news as 
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well as gifts and trade goods, all of which signified a great deal of trust between two men 
divided by both national borders and religion.
 Aisha’s letters also reveal a number of intimate connections between himself and 
his hosts and colleagues in France, a connection that was further established between 
their respective families.  In one letter, he expressed his love to Madame Le Camus, a 
woman of the French court, in a letter which was addressed “To reach the hand of the 
Madame de Signor Le Camus from your lover, and the one who yearns for your face and 
whose condition cannot be hidden.”112  In other letters to his factors and contacts, he 
expressed his sincere hope for good words about their families and assured them that 
their wives, sisters and daughters are much on the minds and lips of his own daughters. In 
doing so, he displayed a great deal of friendship and familial affection for his French 
contacts which stretch far beyond religious or cultural divisions.113
 The truly unique aspect of Muslim travel writing is the willingness of traveling 
religious scholars to seek out and debate religion and theology with Christians.  Although 
there was a distinct sense of self-assurance about the correctness of their faith, these 
individuals were primarily concerned in proving their arguments with logic and reason, 
and would make an effort to base their arguments on Christian sources in order to 
convince their opponents of the virtues of the Muslim faith.  Ahmad bin Qasim was such 
a scholar, one who was quite familiar with the Christian faith as a forced convert in 
Andalucia before he fled to the safety of Morocco in 1595.  
50
 112 Abdallah bin Aisha, 201-2.
 113 Abdallah bin Aisha, 212-3.
 Qasim was a negotiator sent to France and Holland in 1609, to negotiate on behalf 
of Muslims who had been robbed by Christian ship captains during the expulsion from 
Iberia.114   However, his account began with the statement that the “purpose of his writing 
was to present an account of his intellectual and theological encounters with the 
Christians of Europe.”115  As such, Qasim was writing primarily for a religious audience 
in the Arabic world, both to reassure travelers of the superiority of the Muslim faith and 
to provide a model for proper behavior in the lands of the unbelievers.
 Qasim recounted his debates with French nobles and clergy, particularly over the 
issues of fasting, alcohol and proscribed foods, arguing that Christians do not follow the 
correct proscriptions that are present even in the Christian Gospels.116  His account 
focused primarily on his own successful logic, the Christians; grudging acceptance of 
some, but not all, of his points, particularly in the matter of alcohol consumption and their 
failure to refute his arguments.  At times he strayed from the religious focus on his text, 
in particular his stay in Olonne which largely dealt with his relationship with a young 
French noblewoman and their mutual attraction toward each other.  By his account, 
Qasim resisted the temptation he felt toward this unnamed woman, largely by attempting 
to educate her on, and remind himself of, virtuous behavior.
 Qasim’s account was structured by each city he visited in his travels, and the 
debates he had there.  Unsurprisingly, Qasim’s account displayed him in an intensively 
positive light, always patient and offering explanations for any questions relating to Islam 
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and always on the winning side of any religious debate.  While he did not always 
convince his audience of the correctness of his position, usually because of their own 
stubbornness, he left his readers with a lingering sense of his spiritual authority and 
superiority, having triumphed over his disputational opponents using their own books and 
tools.  Given that his work was intended for a Muslim audience, it is not at all surprising 
that it reflects the ideal of the superiority of Islam. 
 Mohammad bin abd al-Wahad al-Ghassani was another Moroccan diplomat sent 
by Mulay Ismal in the late seventeenth century.  Like Qasim and Aisha, al-Ghassani was 
sent by his lord to negotiate with Christians, in this case primarily for Islamic books left 
behind in the expulsion from Spain, but also for Muslim captives, in exchange for 
Christian captives.  Unlike Qasim, al-Ghassani focused on the country rather than the 
people, and his was the first Muslim account of Spain since the expulsion in 1609.117  
While al-Ghassani was much more hostile to Christianity, as he was traveling in lands 
that he considered to rightly belong to his people, he remained respectful of Christianity 
and like Qasim, used the Bible rather than the Koran to refute Christians with whom he 
disputed.
 Al-Ghassani’s account is partly a history of Spain, particularly Andalus, and the 
geography and cities through which he traveled.  He combined this with a sense of 
religious purpose, and the need to redeem captives for his lord.118  Upon his arrival in the 
Andalusian region, al-Ghassani was overwhelmed by its beauty, which he in part he 
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ascribes to being, “of the descent of the Andalus and of the blood of the last king of 
Granada.”119 In his travels through Spain, he often stayed with descendants of conversos, 
Muslims who had been forced to adopt Christianity.  He made a point of teaching them 
about Islam, and generally leaves hopeful that he had left enough of a positive impression 
upon them to guide them back to their “true faith.”120  
 Al-Ghassani’s descriptions of the countryside were quite vivid, both in imagery 
and in clear directions from one location to another.  As he approached the Spanish 
capital, his account shifted to include commentaries on monastic orders, and then the 
history of the House of Hapsburg, and finally the Inquisition.  From his comments, al-
Ghassani was convinced that the purpose of the Inquisition was primarily to convert or 
slay the surviving members of the Jewish population in Spain.  While the focus of 
Qasim’s account was religion and spiritual matters, al-Ghassini was much more 
concerned with historical, geographic and political concerns.  While he referenced 
debates with Christian figures, particularly with the monks of various monasteries along 
his route, his account was much more influenced by temporal matters than spiritual 
ones.121  
 Despite this emphasis, he did delve into what he considered to be the failings of 
the Christian faith, and remarked that “they have followed error in what they uphold of 
their false doctrine and flagrant error and deviance from the right path and the clear 
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argument.”122  He holds the popes personally responsible for these errors, and expresses 
some regret that among many of the common people, these errors can only be cured by 
the sword.123  Oddly, however, the text does not relate the fate of the captives on whose 
behalf he was to negotiate, but instead ends with the description of several mosques that 
he hope will some day return to the hands of faithful Muslims.124
 In this context, Busbecq’s Turkish Letters raised some peculiar issues of 
interpretation.  Despite his status as diplomat on behalf of Ferdinand I, King of Bohemia 
and Hungary and later Holy Roman Emperor, Busbecq’s letters and reports display an 
open sympathy and respect for the Ottomans and their ways Busbecq’s care and openness 
were of particular note since he was writing to fellow diplomat Nicholas Michault and he 
later prepared final drafts for publication in both Antwerp and Paris before his death.125  
His respect was particularly evident when it came to military matters, as he clearly 
admired the discipline, sobriety and patience of the Ottoman armies, comparing them 
rather despairingly to the poor quality of the Hapsburg armies, saying “One army must 
prevail and the other be destroyed... can we doubt what the result will be?”126  Much of 
the text was concerned with the rebellion of Süleyman’s son Bayezid, and the latter’s 
involvement with the Safavids, in his attempt to wrest the throne from his father.  
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Busbecq repeatedly expressed fear that once that problem was solved, the Ottomans 
would be free to campaign against the German lands again.127
 Busbecq was also willing to put aside traditional Christian moral judgements. At 
one point, he commented in passing on the practice of slave raiding, and the profits the 
Ottoman raise by such a practice.  Rather than condemning it outright, he merely noted 
“that the ancient Romans did not despise gains from this source” and that they do not 
practice slavery against fellow Muslims.128  This lack of judgement or moral outrage was 
rather astonishing for the time, and was a distinct contrast from the tone of the 
Türkenbüchlein on the same topic.  Those writings depicted the Turks  as merciless 
towards slaves, as they treated slaves like livestock, and “leave no stone unturned in their 
effort to convert the salves to the false and diabolical doctrines of Mahomet.”129  
Busbecq’s lack of concern was emphasized by his comments on slavery as an institution, 
which he glorified, and cited both the need to control weak-willed individuals and the 
need for labor to erect great public works in the spirit of the ancients.130
 The writings of men such as Paul Rycaut further illustrated this picture from the 
other direction, for despite his personal distaste for the Turks as a people and a grudging 
admission of their admirable qualities, he admitted to the necessity of English trade with 
the Ottoman Empire for the good of the nation.131   Rycaut was surprisingly aware of 
distinctions within Muslim society and his Present State of the Ottoman Empire, 
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published in 1619, offers up his observations after five years as part of an embassy in 
Constantinople, summing up his experience and qualifications. In his epistles to his 
readers and his sponsor, he claims to draw much of his information from his own 
explorations and from Turkish records.132   Rycaut’s opinion of the Ottoman Empire was 
a fairly negative one, as he claims the Turks themselves are almost utterly without merit, 
as they lack “faithfulness, virtue and moral honesty,” yet states that, “one might admire 
the long continuance of this great and vast Empire.”133  This inherent contradiction is not 
unique in European accounts of Muslims, and was perhaps a product of a need to be 
perceived as a good Christian, and the easiest way to do so was to criticize Muslims.  
Additionally, this was likely an attempt to deal with the same fear of domination that 
informed the polemical sources, as well as an attempt by some Europeans to indirectly 
project power onto Ottomans.
 Despite his opinions, Rycaut was aware of many of the subtleties and differences 
among the Ottomans themselves, most particularly in the matter of religion.  Unlike 
many observers, Rycaut recognized a number of different sects and heresies among the 
Ottomans and carefully recorded the distinctions between them.134  Unsurprisingly, 
however, Rycaut sees an inevitable conflict between Christians and Muslims, and takes 
great care to blame this conflict on Muslims, going into great deal about a covenant of 
toleration and cooperation with Christians adopted by Muslims in the early days of Islam, 
56
 132 Rycaut, Epistle Dedicatory and Epistle to the Reader.
 133 Rycaut, 2.
 134 Rycaut, 141-50.
which was abandoned once the Islamic faith was more secure.135  This later assertion is 
contradicted by Evliya Çelebi, who is quite self-assured when asserting the rights of the 
Christian population, even when their customs offend him, indicating that he takes this 
level of tolerance for granted.  In his travels in Albania he refers to the Christian 
population of Gjirokaster in Southern Albania, who “drink alcoholic beverages. Lovers 
go hand in hand with their pretty boys and embrace them and dance about in the manner 
of the Christians.  This is quite shameful behavior, characteristic of the infidels; but it is 
their custom, so we cannot censure it.”136  In this case Evliya Çelebi’s comments referred 
to the constraints imposed by Islamic law on the toleration of Christian and Jewish 
populations within Muslims.
  Some writers are unable to keep positive traits out of largely negative 
accounts.  One example of this is Guillaume-Joseph Grelot, a French traveler and 
merchant, who wrote his account of his travels to Constantinople as advice for others to 
follow.  He recounts that upon returning to France, he offered his work to King of France 
in lieu of gifts of gold or silver, who was reportedly so delighted by the work that he 
ordered it published.137  Grelot’s condemnation of the Ottomans is not simply limited to 
past actions or what he saw as a heritage of barbarity.  He described them as limiting the 
possibilities of their subjects, particularly in the arts and sciences:
 They are the sworn enemies of ingenuity, not having any thing among them, but 
 what their own natural stupidity prompts them to, for the meer support of humane 
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 life: So far are they from the ancient quaintness and ingenuity of the sedulous. 
 Egyptians, Arabians, and Greeks, whose Territories they now Lord over,
 tyrannizing over their posterity with so much cruelty, that they will not suffer 
 them to improve those Arts or Sciences among themselves, which their Ancestors 
 first found out, nor to make use of that knowledge which they have gain'd 
 elsewhere.138
 Despite this venom, Grelot does manage to find some positive characteristics 
among the Ottoman Turks.  For example, in Gallipoli, he finds a very admirable 
coexistence among a disparate population, as “most of the Sea-Towns of the Turkish 
Empire is peopl'd with Christians, Jews, and Turks, who have every one their Churches, 
Synagogues, and Mosquees, and corresponding very amicably together.”139  He also 
blamed most of the crime within the Ottoman Empire not on the Turks themselves, 
despite their destructive nature, but on Christian renegades who have renounced their 
faith and converted to Islam.  “All the mischief which is done in Turkie is done by the 
Renegado's, and not by the Turks, who are naturally civil and tractable enough, especially  
where they meet with persons conformable to their fashions, and that carefully avoid 
giving scandal or offence.”140  It was difficult to reconcile the different images of the 
Ottomans put forth by Grelot, especially since he interspersed the text with such remarks 
as “among the Turks, there are several who will sell their consciences at a cheap rate.”141  
Such tendencies, coupled with a rule of tyranny and cruelty, stand in marked contrast to 
the amicable coexistence Grelot found in Gallipolli. Perhaps Grelot was attempting to 
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balance his commentary to suit his audience or purpose, but it was interesting that he 
should focus on the peaceful coexistence between different faiths in Gallipolli. It is 
possible that he discerned some possibility of Christians influencing the Ottomans in 
some way, or a hope for coexistence that did not involve an Ottoman conquest of Europe.
 A profoundly interesting commentary on Ottoman policy comes through Sir John 
Chardin second hand from the Venetian ambassador, Signor Quirini, who tells Chardin 
that “the Turkish Policy did very much surpass that of the Europeans: That it was not 
confin'd within Maxims and Rules; but consisted altogether in Sense and Judgment, as 
being grounded altogether upon Reason.” More importantly, the Chardin relayed that 
 He assur'd me, That if had a Son, he would send him to no other School then to 
 the Ottoman Court; where he could not too highly admire the Vizier, who without 
 speaking, writing, or so much as moving himself, Govern'd one of the most Potent 
 Empires of the World, and had extended the Limits of it in several places.142
While second hand, this account stands at odds with Chardin’s own description of the 
Ottoman people, whom he described as unintelligent, “There are no People in the World 
that have been more frequently cheated, or that are more easily gull'd then the Turks; as 
being naturally very dull, and thick-skull'd, and apt to believe any fair Story.”143  While 
this later view may have been Chardin’s own opinion on the Ottomans from the 
standpoint of a successful merchant, the inclusion of a glowing description of the 
Ottoman court from a Venetian ambassador casts a different light on his account.  By 
providing a positive view of the Ottomans by way of a second hand, and more 
importantly, foreign voice, it was possible that Chardin was catering to his intended 
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audience while providing a more honest opinion in the background.  As a French 
Protestant during the reign of Louis XIV, a strongly Catholic monarch, Chardin had to be 
cautious in his presentation of material, particularly as he dedicated the work to his 
sovereign and presented it to the King as a gift at court.144
 Lorenzo Bernardo, a Venetian ambassador, expressed admiration for the “religion, 
frugality and obedience” which made their conquests possible.145  However, Bernardo’s 
1592 report was an examination of the Ottoman Empire cast in terms of the decline of 
these traits in hopes of finding evidence of the decline of the Empire.  Despite this, he 
fully illustrated his knowledge of Ottoman society and his admiration of the 
accomplishments that derived from the traits of religion, frugality and obedience. 
Considering the number of conflicts and rivalries between the Ottoman Empire and 
Venice, the level of respect and grudging admiration is quite surprising. The Ottomans 
were not cast as simple evil infidels to be overcome, but a major power that compared 
favorably to Greek, Roman and Persian Empires.146
 This last aspect is particularly important in regard to Ottoman history and 
historiography, as Bernardo would have been well aware of the Ottoman historians who 
claimed that with the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottoman sultans were the true heirs 
to the Roman Empire.  This claim was reinforced by Süleyman, after he forced Emperor 
Charles V and Archduke Ferdinand to the treaty table in 1547. Ferdinand renounced his 
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claim to the kingdom of Hungary and paid 30,000 ducats a year to the Ottoman Empire 
for his Hungarian holdings.  As a result of this treaty, the symbolic language of the 
Ottoman court changed.  Süleyman now referred to Charles the V as King of Spain, not 
Emperor, and used the title ‘Emperor of the Romans’ for himself.147  For a Venetian 
ambassador to have reinforced such an idea, even indirectly, to his own government a 
half century later was a significant admission of the power and prestige of the Ottoman 
Empire.
 In The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire, Daniel Goffman 
reinforced the importance of Ottoman-Venetian diplomacy and claimed it was one of the 
foundations of international diplomacy in Europe.  He went so far as to say that many of 
the “essential elements” of modern diplomatic systems are based on Italian experiences 
with the Ottoman Empire.  Goffman listed “permanent missions, extra-territoriality, 
reciprocity and the gathering of intelligence” as a few of these essential elements.148  He 
held that Italian diplomacy in the Ottoman court helped to “unmask (or at least to temper) 
myths about the impenetrable Orient and the ‘terrible Turk.’”149  As such, diplomacy was 
a key to an understanding between Europeans and Ottomans, as well as a basis for 
diplomatic practice between European nations.
 This was all possible, claimed Goffman, because of the structure of Ottoman 
society.  The legal and traditional codes that allowed Christians and Jewish subjects to 
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live within the Empire were easily stretched to grant rights to foreign visitors.  However, 
a significant problematic aspect to Goffman’s argument is that the diplomatic missions 
were not truly reciprocal.  Both the structure of Ottoman governance, based around the 
ahidnames150 and other political documents, and the reluctance of European powers to 
accept communities of Muslims inside their capitals contributed to the lack of permanent 
or long term Ottoman diplomatic missions or resident embassies.151  A fear of Muslim 
communities within European cities would have been viewed as an even greater problem 
than the views some European held of Jewish neighborhoods within the capitals. As 
outsiders, many Europeans would not have been able to trust such a community, 
particularly since it had the backing and support of a powerful empire.
 One surprising source of positive views of the Ottomans comes from a man who 
the Turks held as a military prisoner and slave.  The writings of M. Dalerac, the author of 
a set of manuscripts claiming to be the Secret History of the Reign of John Sobieski the 
III, provide an incredible first hand insight into the Ottoman Empire.  Despite the 
grandiose title and some second hand history, the documents contained many 
observations of the author, who was a ‘domestic’ in service to the Queen of Poland.  
While the reasons behind why he traveled with the army of John Sobieski III were 
unclear, he may have been present to take letters between the royal couple.  Dalerac was 
present for the lifting of the siege of Vienna, and he also recorded his travels and capture 
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during the subsequent campaign into Hungary and his year as a Turkish slave. His 
captivity, despite the hardships he endured, was the most valuable aspect of the work, as 
it provides a great deal of first hand impressions of life among the Ottomans, starting 
with his capture:
 I found all my Comrades, that had been taken with me the Day before, 
 with the Heads of those that had been kill'd, fix'd at the end of a Pole, and carry'd 
 each by one of the Cavaliers. This was a dreadful Sight, and the only Instance of 
 Cruelty to be observ'd in all the Turkish Customs; for they are a Nation endu'd 
 with a great deal of Humanity, and Charity, having a Sweetness of Temper 
 tho' unpolish'd, and a Bravery, without any thing of Fierceness.152
 Despite his trials as a slave, Dalerac managed to keep a fairly balanced view on 
the Ottomans, and rather surprisingly does not turn his manuscript into a polemic against 
the infidels.  Instead he took a rational measure of his captors, commenting on widely 
diverging topics. On their social order, he related: “they make no Distinction or 
Subordination of Quality, Birth, or Profession. They are all Equal, excepting their 
Offices, which only make the Distinction: so that the Sons of a Bassa, and the Grooms of 
his Stables, when he is dead, are upon the same Level.”153  
 While Dalerac had mixed impressions of Turkish moral qualities, he did try to 
relate those qualities and evaluate them.  He was ambivalent about their character, and 
described them as “steady in Adversity, less proud in Prosperity, and more patient in 
Misery, and Slavery.”154  He was more positive about the social order within the Empire: 
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“here I add that Quarrels are very rare among them... every one lives in his own family, 
without concerning himself with what is done abroad.”155  However he was less certain 
about their moral qualities, and contradicts himself on the subject, describing robberies as 
scarce, but the Turks themselves inclined to avarice:
 Their Justice is severe, their Obedience blind, their Religion reverenc'd, 
 and Robberies are scarce known among them, by the care that is taken 
 to root up the very seeds of such a Practice: So that they lock up nothing, 
 their Chambers, Coffers, and Chests do all lye open: And were it not for 
 that sordid Avarice, to which all the Turks are inclin'd, and a propensity to 
 a certain dreadfull piece of debauchery, to which they are more addicted 
 than the Italians, and all other Nations of the World besides, were it not, I 
 say, for these things, they would equal any other People in their Morals.156
Dalerac’s prejudices, while still apparent in these lines, did appear to be slipping away 
from the standard polemical viewpoint.  Unlike many of his contemporaries, his personal 
interactions with the Turks appeared to raise his opinion of them, despite his capture and 
his captivity and enslavement.  In particular, it contrasts sharply with the views of 
Sobieski, who Dalerac served at the beginning of the Vienna campaign.  Where Sobieski 
saw an enemy to be fought and defeated in the name of God and Poland, Dalerac found 
some common ground and reasons to respect the Ottomans despite what he had suffered 
as a captive and slave.
 The non-polemical sources consisted of a wide variety of voices with their own 
interests and agenda but it is significant that they, to some degree or other, manage to 
shift away from a commentary of fear, propaganda or domination.  These sources 
contributed greatly to the critique of Said’s theory of a history of European domination, 
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as many of the authors did not seek conflict between Europeans and Ottomans.  Further, 
the common ground that can be found between Muslim sources and European sources 
erodes this aspect of Orientalism further.   This common ground despite social and 
religious differences also contributed to the idea that the Ottoman Empire is a part of 
Europe to a significant degree, as trade, diplomacy and personal contact allowed 
members of both groups to move through the society of the other in a functional way, in 
spite of religious differences or which side of the theoretical divide between European 
and non-European they were most familiar with.
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Chapter IV: Conclusion
 There was a great variety of sources and voices in the European sources on 
Ottomans and the Ottoman Empire.  The primary division was between sources that were 
a polemical reaction against the Ottomans, largely out of fear of domination or 
destruction, and sources that advocated some manner of relationship between European 
states and the Ottoman Empire.  Both sides of this divide cause a problem for a 
fundamental assumption of Edward Said’s Orientalism theory, that any relationship 
between Europeans and others in the Middle East is defined by European dominance.  
For the early modern period and the Ottoman Empire in particular, this was an incorrect 
assumption, as the balance of power was in fact much more even, and for much of the 
period, tilted in favor of the Ottomans.
 The polemical views were informed by major military and political events and 
while they were imbedded deep within their own context, they displayed a great deal of 
common ground in their roots. The most fundamental commonality between the 
polemical sources was a strong fear of Ottoman domination of Europe and Christendom. 
While the conflict was in some ways a normal clash between empires and monarchies as 
the Europeans understood it, they also viewed it as a significant conflict between 
religions as well as the potential domination by a culturally foreign other.  While fifteenth 
century polemics were informed largely by the fall of Constantinople, the sixteenth 
century polemics were in many ways the most complex, as they were also a reaction to 
the unsuccessful or lack of attempts to challenge the Ottomans.  This was particularly true 
in the German lands, were it was further complicated by the confessional divide between 
Catholic and Protestant as well as the conflicts with other European powers, particularly 
France, who went so far as to ally with the Ottomans at the expense of their mutual rival, 
the Hapsburgs.  In the late seventeenth century, the polemics took a different turn, in the 
form of propaganda to support the war against the Ottomans in the wake of the King 
Sobieski’s forces raising the siege at Vienna in 1683.  These particular polemics were 
rapidly distributed and used to raise moral and support for an alliance of Christian powers 
against the Ottomans, a Holy League that in fact achieved unprecedented success by 
driving the Ottomans out of Hungary.
 The non-polemical sources were a product of a wide variety of individuals, but 
were largely produced by merchants, travelers and diplomats.  For the most part, these 
individuals found some value within the Ottoman Empire, be it a sense of order, an 
efficient and disciplined military, or a necessary trading partner in the face of political 
and economic reality. Many of these accounts were responses based on first-hand 
interaction with the Ottoman Empire and people, often over a period of several years. The 
fear of domination was not altogether absent from these accounts, but they were quite 
distinct from the polemical accounts and generally highly individualized. 
 For men such as Paul Rycaut, a British diplomat, the Ottoman Empire was a 
potential threat, but more important it was too important as a trading partner to be bogged 
down in religious conflicts.  For the Hapsburg diplomat Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, the 
Empire was a potential threat to his nation, but culturally had a great deal to offer.  Other 
ambassadors also found aspects of the Empire worthy or important despite a history of 
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conflict between Europeans and Ottomans. The merchants were often divided in their 
opinions between dislike and fear of the other and the need for trade or some other 
appealing quality of Ottoman society.  The most important aspect of the non-polemic 
sources was their ability to interact with Ottoman society and pass through Ottoman 
territory without significant problems.  The toleration for non-Muslims built into 
Ottoman law undoubtedly contributed to this, but in most cases these individuals were 
able to remain within the Ottoman Empire for significant periods of time or leave and 
return to the Empire without significant conflict.
 Additionally, the importance of the non-polemical sources was reinforced by the 
common ground that could be found with the accounts of Muslim travelers in the same 
period.  These accounts displayed reciprocal attitudes towards Europe and Europeans that 
many of the non-polemical sources displayed towards the Ottoman Empire and Ottomans 
in general.  The commonalities in the accounts also demonstrated a great deal of evidence 
for the idea that while the Ottoman Empire was unique in many respects it was also 
tightly tied into the European network of trade and diplomacy, and further demonstrated 
that individuals on both sides of the cultural divide could operate effectively with the 
other culture.
 The importance of the non-polemical sources should not be understated, as they 
provided additional insights into the relationship between the European powers and the 
Ottoman Empire, as well as the alternative views of Europeans of the middle and upper 
classes. While the polemical sources should not be dismissed, the use of additional voices 
provided a greater integrity to the fabric of early modern history.  The additional sources 
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added depth to the history of the period, one more complicated and more in keeping with 
the reality of the period, rather than a simplified overview of historical progress.  This 
study was only a brief overview of the existent and diverse sources that survived from the 
early modern period.  Further studies could provide even more insights to the complex 
web of relationships between Europe and the Ottoman Empire, and add illumination to 
the question of whether the Ottoman Empire was an entity wholly part of Europe, or a 
complex structure that straddled different worlds and world-views.  The voices of early 
modern Europeans, however, were sufficient to establish that the Ottomans of the early 
modern period were not a community entirely apart from Europe.  Their integration into 
the community of European states was not complete, but it was a fundamental part of 
European interaction and trade, and helped to shape the course of European history.
 Further research could focus on specific areas of interest, especially different parts 
of Europe and their specific relationships with the Ottoman Empire.   These regional 
studies can then be examined for insights into larger patterns, such as religious and trade 
relationships.  One specific area of interest was the diplomatic and mercantile 
relationships of the Italian cities and the Ottoman Empire. While Daniel Goffman 
suggested that the Italian diplomatic missions had a direct effect on later diplomatic 
practice in Europe,157 the records could also be used to examine the conflicts over Italian 
trading posts and colonies throughout the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.
 The complex interactions in Hungary are of special concern, partly because it 
formed the border zone between the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires, but also because of 
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the rich complexity of daily life in a region undergoing political flux, with multiple levels 
of government and autonomy.  The morass of the political relationships must have had an 
effect on daily life in the nation, as Pál Fodor sketched in his brief discussion Trade and 
Traders in Hungary in the Age of Ottoman Conquest: an Outline. The interactions of 
merchants and travelers with the array of Hungarian nobles and their Hapsburg, Ottoman 
or independent Hungarian overlords was worthy of significant study. The period after the 
Treaty of Karlowitz was also worthy of study, and a great deal could be learned by 
building on Rifaat A. Abou-el-Haj’s Closure of the Ottoman Frontier, and using the 
Hungarian archives to map any potential change in attitudes toward or interaction with 
the Ottoman Empire.   The rich tapestry of confessional diversity in Hungary also 
requires examination, as does the relationship between the various ethnic groups and the 
Ottoman Empire and the Islamic faith.
 The relationships and alliances between France and the Ottomans also require 
examination.  While men like Dumont rejected French alliances with the Ottomans, the 
alliances often served the best interest of France against their Hapsburg rivals.158  The 
conflict between political and religious interests was particularly apparent in French-
Ottoman relations, more so than any other European state. The reaction from both the 
pulpit and the palace, as well as the reactions from other European states, would shed a 
great deal of light on the nature of this relationship.
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 The Hapsburg Empire was of course the main rival of the Ottoman Empire, and 
best personified by the rivalry between Süleyman and Charles V.159  A great deal more 
can be learned by examining the diplomatic relationships between the Ottoman and 
Hapsburg states.  Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, while concerned with the possibility of a 
new campaign against the German lands and interests, seemed quite open to the 
possibilities of learning from the Ottomans in both military and social fields, and 
developing closer relations with the Sultan and his government.160  While Paul Rycaut 
provided a similar insight into the British relationship with the Ottoman Empire, a clearer 
picture of Hapsburg diplomatic efforts is necessary to understand the relationship 
between Hapsburg diplomacy and the large amount of polemical voices against the 
Ottomans in the sixteenth century.
 Further work can also be done in the area of confessional interaction- how the 
Greek Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant churches interacted with the Muslim faith and 
vice versa, as well as how they interacted with each other in wake of the spread of an 
Islamic empire. Martin Luther at times described the Turks as a tool of the Papacy to be 
used to destroy the Protestant faith,161 but Ottoman historians such as Halil Inalçik have 
suggested a closer relationship between Ottomans and Protestants due to their rejection of 
idols and the Papacy.162  
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 159 See Cornell H. Fleischer, “The Lawgiver as Messiah: The Making of the Imperial Image in the 
Reign of Süleyman” in Süleyman the Magnificent and His Time, ed. Gilles Veinstein (Paris: Ecole des 
Hatues Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 1992).
 160 Busbecq, 101-2 and 106.
 161 Luther, 27-8.
 162 Halil Inalçik, The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age 1300-1600 (London: Phoneix 
Paperback, 2000), 37.
 Of course, it is of vital importance to do similar work with Ottoman sources.  
Ottoman views on Europeans are of particular importance, as are their own views on their 
self-identity: did the segments of the Ottoman population consider themselves to be part 
of Europe. Additionally, their views on their own religious and ethnic identity was of 
particular important in such a vast and diverse state.  Ottomans merchants and diplomats 
could provide significant insights into the treatment and relationships between Ottoman 
travelers and European communities. 
 This research also has significant applicability to other fields.  It is possible to 
reexamine the simple assumptions of Western dominance and hostility between European 
and other. The field of travel writing is specifically applicable, how it relates to the work 
of Dathorne’s Imagining the World, Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, and 
Boies Penrose’s Travel and Discovery in the Renaissance as well as others. As a separate 
frontier from the Atlantic World, there is a great deal to be learned in the differences 
between Atlantic travelers and those that traveled in the Mediterranean and Eastern 
Europe.
 The polemical and non-polemical sources provided a great deal of insight into the 
complexity of early modern society.  The non-polemical sources altered the classical 
historiographical story of inherent conflict between Europe and the Ottomans.  The 
default assumption that all Europeans would be hostile to the traditional enemies of 
Christendom could be seen as false assumption. At the same time, however, the 
traditional story can not be rejected entirely, as there was a great deal of polemical 
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